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This field study from Sirohi district, Rajasthan, reveals 
that, faced with staff shortages, resource constraints and 
mountains of paperwork, officials and teachers of the 
primary education department employ a variety of 
innovations that they term beech ka raasta to deal with 
challenges and meet targets. This article examines the 
strategies employed by the lower-level bureaucracy to 
get the job done in the jugaad framework, suggesting 
that these tactics are not employed to subvert policy but 
rather to implement it in the spirit of seva. 
1 Introduction
On the very fi rst day of fi eldwork, as my co-researcher and I set out to understand the everyday workings of the block education offi ce (primary education) in Sirohi 
district, Rajasthan, we were confronted with the image of 
comfortably seated offi cials gossiping and toying with their 
smartphones.1 This stereotypical image of inactivity and 
 leisure, we soon realised, cloaked the actual work of ensuring 
the distribution of a circular that had arrived at the offi ce. The 
circular demanded immediate attention since it mandated the 
implementation of certain programmes under the Swachh 
Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Mission) for an entire week in all 
primary schools in the block.2 We asked the offi cials how they 
were planning to distribute copies of the circular to the 
schools. The offi cials informed us that they would adopt a 
beech ka raasta or middle path to get the job done. This 
 involved photographing the circular and sending a copy of it to 
all the teachers of the block who were members of a WhatsApp 
group. Mobile internet and smartphone technology thus 
 accomplished the task within seconds. Later that day, hard 
copies of the circular were also distributed to teachers attend-
ing a workshop conducted by the Azim Premji Foundation 
(APF). The teachers were asked to deliver the circular to their 
respective schools and nodal headmasters. 
The task would not have been possible had it not been for 
these innovative methods adopted by the offi cials. The circu-
lar mandated all schools to have a copy of the order regarding 
the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan programme for the coming week 
and this would have required the resource persons of the 
block to travel to every nodal school to deliver them.3 Beech 
ka  raasta or the middle path was a phrase repeatedly invoked 
by the offi cials throughout our study and it became abun-
dantly clear that these innovative tactics were being em-
ployed on a daily basis. The purpose of our fi eld study was to 
inspect the everyday workings of the primary education 
 bureaucracy in Sirohi district of Rajasthan and it therefore 
became imperative to  focus on the use of these innovative 
tactics in the daily routine of the offi cials at the block and 
school levels. 
Our study was facilitated by the APF, a non-profi t organisa-
tion that plays a key role in primary education in this region.4 
Sirohi district is divided into fi ve blocks—Pindwara, Sheoganj, 
Reodar, Abu Road and Sirohi. The two blocks chosen for the 
study were Pindwara and Sheoganj, based on their proximity 
to Sirohi (our base) and differences in their sociopolitical 
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 environment. Pindwara was the more underdeveloped block, 
typically described as an area where one was “stuck” if one 
was posted there.5 Pindwara is also larger than Sheoganj and 
has a larger number of schools (some of which are situated in 
mountainous terrain). Sheoganj, on the other hand, was cate-
gorised as a “politically active and highly contested” block. It 
borders the nearby Pali district and has fewer schools.
APF staff members introduced us to the offi cials at the block 
level. No questionnaire was used for the interviews and inter-
actions were kept open-ended. Given that the primary objec-
tive was to understand the everyday routines of these offi cials, 
it became necessary to spend as much time at the block-level 
offi ce as possible. While most of the interviews were conduct-
ed jointly, my co-researcher and I worked individually on a 
few occasions so that one of us could spend time at the block-
level offi ce while the other spent time at a nearby school, inter-
acting with teachers. 
Throughout the fi eld study, I used only a small notepad to 
make notes during interviews. Overall, 38 days were used for 
fi eldwork, while the remaining duration of the fi eld project 
was used for documentation and literature review. The meth-
ods used for the fi eld study included participant observation 
and informal interviews. The former included staying at the 
block-level offi ce as well as handling a few classes on a couple 
of  occasions when the teachers were busy fi lling forms.6 
Interviews were carried out with all the offi cials at the 
block-level offi ce, which included two block education offi cers 
from Pindwara7 and Sheoganj, four block resource persons 
from Pindwara, and four block resource persons from 
 Sheoganj. We spent more time at the block-level offi ces than at 
the schools, given that the objective of our study was to under-
stand the functioning of a block-level offi ce. However, keeping 
in mind the importance of teachers and the headmaster or 
headmistress in implementing policy decisions, we managed 
to visit about 15 schools across both blocks. We also had the 
opportunity to attend two school nodal meetings in both 
blocks and had a very brief interaction with the additional dis-
trict education offi cer and district education offi cer, Sirohi, as 
well as an offi cial of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) district 
project offi ce. 
Each block resource centre is headed by a block education 
offi cer who is assisted by the block resource persons. Ideally, 
each block is also supposed to comprise two additional block 
education offi cers and a clerk or peon. Similarly, the primary 
education schools in the area are divided into nodal groups, 
each headed by a nodal headmaster or headmistress. Each 
school has a headmaster or headmistress, and teaching staff. 
However, what ought to be in place was hardly ever so. There 
is a shortage of personnel at both block and school levels, and 
Pindwara fared worse than Sheoganj. Some schools, as it 
turned out, had more teachers than required, while others 
were severely understaffed. Faced with such challenges, these 
offi cials were required to produce enormous amounts of 
 paperwork under various central and state government 
schemes. The production of this paperwork was designated, 
amongst other tasks, as “monthly targets.” 
These monthly targets mandate up-to-date maintenance 
and fi ling of records at the block and school levels for various 
central and state government schemes. The block resource 
persons are responsible for achieving their monthly targets, 
including carrying out inspections under schemes such as the 
Reading Campaign and Continuous and Comprehensive Eval-
uation (CCE), making sure that schools follow the right to 
 education (RTE) norms and meet the SSA requirements.8 The 
results of these inspections are registered in a questionnaire 
covering all the guidelines to be met by the school. In addition, 
they are required to follow orders from the higher levels of the 
bureaucracy. These include passing circulars such as the one 
about the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, the organisation and coor-
dination of workshops for teachers, and monthly meetings for 
nodal headmasters or headmistresses as well as heads of 
schools to explain new directives and guidelines. Similarly, 
teachers in the schools are expected to prepare records under 
the Reading Campaign, CCE and Mid-day Meal schemes, as 
well as records of other expenses and activities, all of which 
are subject to inspection by resource persons of the block and 
to surprise/routine checks by seniors (the block education 
 offi cer or district education offi cer). This huge load of paper-
work is made considerably diffi cult by the absence of suffi cient 
human resources (teachers and clerical staff). It was not 
 surprising, therefore, to see the amount of time invested by 
both schools and block offi ces in preparing these documents 
for inspection.
2 Exploring Beech ka Raasta Tactics
Our respondents (block offi cials from Pindwara and Sheoganj) 
were of the opinion that the legislation of new laws such as the 
RTE and the introduction of schemes such as the Reading Cam-
paign had led to an increased investment of time in the pro-
duction and maintenance of fi les and registers. They believed 
that these tasks were the responsibility of the “administrative” 
staff and not the “academic” staff. Though the distinction does 
not hold good in practice, as both administrative and aca-
demic functions coalesce in the same block resource centre, 
our respondents identifi ed themselves as “academics” and not 
“administrators.” We were told repeatedly that the require-
ments of the profession (singling out the administrative tasks) 
and the challenges faced in implementing policy directives 
were too enormous to carry out without resorting to innova-
tive tactics, shortcuts and the beech ka raasta. These tactics 
were mostly invoked to achieve the monthly targets and daily 
administration tasks (particularly in schools) of block offi cials, 
teachers and heads of schools. The dilemma facing these offi -
cials is obvious—staying committed to the implementation of 
policy but facing considerable constraints in doing so. At the 
block level, in Sheoganj particularly, the block resource per-
sons also make use of the APF resource person to distribute 
circulars and relay messages to schools, attend and contribute 
to nodal meetings and help in arranging and running training 
workshops and meetings.9 However, it is worth noting that 
this is partly because the resource person has, over nearly 
eight years in Sheoganj, been part of APF’s initial programmes 
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in the region, visiting every school in the block and enjoying a 
terrifi c rapport with most of the teachers and offi cials. There is 
a higher degree of association with the APF resource person in 
Sheoganj than in Pindwara.
While the use of smartphones and WhatsApp is relatively 
new, older tactics are also employed. One of them concerns 
the treatment of the mid-day meal cook or helper.10 One 
headmistress pointed out that the mid-day meal cook-cum-
helper also serves as the caretaker or security guard for the 
school. The respondent insisted that with the staff shortage, 
she had to make the best use of available resources to keep the 
school functioning. “Adjustment karna padta hai (it is neces-
sary to make adjustments),” she observed.11 
Another cook-cum-helper at a school situated in the Pin-
dwara mountains is similarly employed for other tasks. A 
teacher at this school reported that there were problems in the 
past when someone from outside the area (and community 
and caste) was appointed. Moreover, while the rules mandate 
that the school management committee take full responsi-
bility for appointing a cook-cum-helper, this hardly ever 
happened and the responsibility fell on the teachers.12 
Appointing these individuals was not an easy task, the teacher 
informed, and it was expedient for the school to retain the 
same person. The tactic employed by the school was to erase 
the name of the individual from the register for a brief period 
citing “absence” or “removal from duty” and then reappoint-
ing him or her.13 
These beech ka raasta methods are known and accepted 
throughout the lower levels of the bureaucratic structure, 
from the block level offi ces to the schools. These tactics are, in 
fact, promoted by the block offi cials in order to make sure that 
schools comply with the mandated paperwork. We observed 
the resource persons from both blocks regularly advising 
teachers and heads of schools on maintaining records and also 
revealing to them the questions they would be asked during 
surprise checks or inspections. 
2.1 Understanding Beech ka Raasta through the 
Concept of Jugaad
One way of understanding the beech ka raasta method con-
ceptually is to circumscribe it under the idea of jugaad, a term 
that has at least three distinct meanings, each of which was 
invoked in different contexts by our respondents. The litera-
ture on jugaad covers all three meanings with varying levels of 
emphasis, depending on the specifi c issue the authors seek to 
explain and analyse. It has been usurped by management 
gurus and promoters of entrepreneurship as an “innovative 
fi x; an improvised solution born from ingenuity and cleverness;” 
in other words, a unique Indian way of arriving at solutions 
(Radjou et al 2012). In this sense, jugaad is seen as a quick-fi x 
solution or a way to make do in cases where there are capital 
and resource constraints. 
This understanding has, however, faced severe criticism for 
indirectly suggesting that poverty and resource constraints 
are not really problems but in fact opportunities for individuals to 
engage in an indigenous or unique way of innovation. In a 
scathing critique of this understanding, Birtchnell (2011) 
argues that jugaad cannot be seen as ingenuity but as “systemic 
risk” emerging in the wider context of poverty. He argues that 
the emphasis on this kind of innovation “forgoes the risk in the 
term’s core practices: it recasts indigence as industriousness,” 
converting “localised risk management into a parsimonious 
scientifi c and technical approach,” thus in fact having a nega-
tive impact on society (Birtchnell 2011: 364). 
Jeffrey and Young (2014) in their paper argue that unemployed 
youth in the city of Meerut in Uttar Pradesh have  resorted to 
jugaad as a way of “euphemising their involvement in corrup-
tion.” The authors argue that lower caste Dalit individuals 
(male) cultivate extensive social contacts and engage as “bro-
kers” and “fi xers” in the fi eld of private education in the city to 
make large amounts of money. Their essay also focuses on the 
reproduction of neo-liberal idioms or notions of “enterprise” 
which, they empirically point out, do not fl ow in a simplistic 
top-down fashion. Their conceptual framework allows us to 
understand how ideas of enterprise are reproduced through 
the vernacular discourse of jugaad in specifi c social settings, 
refl ecting aspects of an individual’s class and gender. In a re-
lated sense, their argument also echoes Birtchnell’s claims 
that the culture of jugaad itself emerges in the context of a so-
cial setting which is often vulnerable and necessitates quick, 
ad hoc fi xes. 
Interestingly, Jeffrey and Young (2014: 188) point out that 
jugaad is a “morally loaded word, connoting in some instances 
positive traits—thrift, quick thinking, imagination—and in 
other circumstances suggesting negative ones: a lack of prin-
ciples, shoddiness, and a predilection for shortcuts.” Further 
complicating the moral sense of the term and blurring the line 
 between “virtue” and “vice,” Jauregui (2014) argues that 
 jugaad is “conceived as necessary” for “getting by.” Drawing 
on fi eldwork on the functioning of police in Uttar Pradesh, she 
provides various instances of how jugaad is practised amongst 
these individuals as a necessary means of “getting by” in con-
trast to the negative meaning and implications of the term 
(dealing with corruption). 
It appears clear that the term jugaad therefore conveys at 
least three distinct meanings. One understanding, fl owing from 
management gurus, romanticises the idea by highlighting  aspects 
such as innovative thinking, low-cost solutions and adapting to 
adversity (Radjou et al 2012). The second has brought to light 
the aspect of “informal social contacts/ networks” which are 
 instrumental in pursuing one’s goals for the purpose of earning 
money (Jeffrey and Young 2014) or as a necessary means of 
getting by (Jauregui 2014). Both these  accounts blur the defi ni-
tion of the term as opposed to a third understanding which 
strictly conveys corruption or a specifi c kind of corruption, such 
as bribery (Jeffrey and Young 2014; Jauregui 2014). Drawing 
on my14 own observations of the functioning of bureaucratic 
offi cials in the two blocks of Sirohi and based on their responses, I 
suggest that their use of the term beech ka raasta is better 
 understood contextually using the idea of jugaad.15 
As mentioned earlier, the offi cials consider resorting to these 
tactics in their everyday routine almost inevitable. These 
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 practices range from the use of smartphone technology to tap-
ping informal social networks and contacts (such as the re-
source person from APF or sometimes the foundation itself) in 
order to get the job done. Thus, in the case of distribution of 
the circular, the offi cials used WhatsApp innovatively to make 
sure the orders reached all schools. Similarly, the fl exible 
treatment of the mid-day meal cook-cum-helpers is also 
 demonstrative of ad hoc methods and making do under res-
ource constraints. While these beech ka raasta methods are 
endorsed and in fact accepted throughout both blocks (and in 
extension one might say even in other blocks of the district), 
they are clearly demonstrative of at least two ways in which 
jugaad itself is understood—as quick-fi x solutions and social 
networks or contacts. Incidentally, in such cases jugaad does 
not convey moral ambiguity as in the case of the “brokers” of 
Meerut (Jeffrey and Young 2014) but emphasises the adjust-
ments needed to get the work done. 
Over the short span of my fi eldwork, I did not come across 
any respondent who attributed to the beech ka raasta method 
a sense of moral ambiguity or any explicitly negative meaning. 
It was only in response to the selection of teachers that my 
 respondents (the block education offi cers of Pindwara and 
Sheoganj) referred to “connections” which young teachers tap 
for favourable placements. The reference to “connections” 
here comes close to the understanding of jugaad as the use of 
social networks or contacts in order to get by, euphemising 
corruption (Jeffrey and Young 2014) and bribery in the process 
and thus explicitly conveying a negative sense of the term. 
However, all my respondents invoked the term beech ka raasta 
only in the sense of a necessary adjustment required for their 
daily functioning. 
2.1.1 Lipsky, Street-level Bureaucracy 
and the Idea of Seva
A study of front-line workers or street-level bureaucrats is 
incomplete without reference to Lipsky’s pioneering work on 
the subject (2010). The major claim in Lipsky’s work is that 
policy is also made at the level of daily interactions, that is, at 
the level at which these bureaucrats operate. Lipsky also 
 argues that given the absence of effective monitoring and 
control mechanisms at the grass-roots level, front-line work-
ers use “discretionary tactics” to subvert policy to their own 
means (2010: xi–xxi). The literature on street-level bureau-
cracy has since then moved on to focus on specifi c bureau-
cracies, stressed the infl uence of practices of professionalism 
and looked at discretionary tactics positively (Maupin 1993; 
Baldwin 2006; Evans and Harris 2004; Evans 2011; Ellis 2011; 
Rowe 2012). Literature on front-line workers or street-level- 
 bureaucrats in India, particularly in the education bureaucracy, 
has tended to focus on the role of teachers in terms of trans-
fers, performance, absenteeism and better pedagogy meas-
ures (Beteille 2009; Clarke 2003; Mooij 2008; Kremer 
et al 2005). 
Throughout our fi eld project, I did not come across any 
 instance of offi cials at the block or school levels trying to sub-
vert policy. Instead, what was constantly emphasised was the 
need to carve out a beech ka raasta in order to implement 
 policy decisions. It is, therefore, interesting to understand 
their motivations in carving out beech ka raasta methods in 
order to accomplish their tasks.
Aiyar et al (2015) through their fi eld study of front-line 
workers in the education bureaucracy in Bihar, argue that 
these workers are guided by a “legalistic” culture, derived 
from their understanding of tasks, “entirely as responsive-
ness to orders from above.” These front-line administrators 
 des cribe themselves as “powerless cogs in a large machine 
over which they have no control” (Aiyar et al 2015: 2). My 
respon dents were similarly unequivocal in admitting that 
admi ni stration or bureaucracy was based on the single rule of 
ji huzoori or yesmanship. This term was used to defi ne the 
block- and school-level offi ces which have no say in the 
affairs of daily administration and are merely ordered to 
 implement orders from the higher authorities (such as the 
 district offi ce).16 
However, a closer analysis of their work routine brought to 
light an important aspect of their motivation to work and their 
outlook towards their profession. Apart from the notions of 
 hierarchy, my respondents defi ned their work as seva or ser-
vice. Defi ning the teaching profession as a public service, they 
saw their role as teachers or academics shaping a new genera-
tion, in effect contributing to society and the country.17 
The juxtaposition of seva and yesmanship presents these 
 bureaucrats as committed offi cials interested in achieving 
what is demanded of them. In other words, despite the obvious 
challenges in terms of shortage of personnel and other 
 resource constraints and the fact that they are burdened with 
more “administrative” than “academic” tasks, these offi cials 
try and ensure the everyday fl ow of bureaucratic work. Thus, 
the beech ka raasta methods become fundamental in their 
 daily work. 
3 Conclusions
In this article, I have attempted to show that apart from a clear 
understanding of hierarchy, these bureaucrats also attach 
meanings such as seva to their profession. The intertwining of 
both explains their functioning. At the same time, this article 
disagrees with the claims made by Lipsky (1980) that lower-
level offi cials subvert or distort policy. In the case of my res-
pondents, I clearly observed that they were committed to their 
job and did not look at it as a means of personal gratifi cation 
(for monetary or other benefi ts). Neither did they attempt to 
subvert or distort policy. On the contrary, in the face of multi-
ple challenges and constraints, they end up carving out beech 
ka raasta methods to get the job done. 
Academic work on bureaucratic practices has also been the 
focus of scholars who have attempted to theorise the Indian 
state by ethnographically constructing it from below (Gupta 
1995). In his book, Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence 
and Poverty in India (2012), Gupta argues that the arbitrariness 
of bureaucratic action and procedure in India makes possible 
conditions of “structural violence” and as a consequence 
 results in the failure of policies of “care” (or  welfare) to the 
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marginalised masses. He demonstrates this by highlighting, 
among other instances, the case of a camp set up for elderly 
people. He demonstrates how this camp is representative of 
the ineptness of bureaucratic functioning, with faulty lines of 
communication, lack of punctuality on the part of government 
offi cials, random assessments of the age of the applicant and 
the sheer chaos of procuring entitlements from the state. Not-
withstanding his other observations and claims, however, I am 
persuaded to disagree with him on the claims of bureaucratic 
practices being arbitrary. 
First, the primary education bureaucracy in Sirohi and else-
where in India suffers from a serious shortage of personnel 
and teacher absenteeism in addition to the political control of 
transfers (Beteille 2009; Clarke 2003; Mooij 2008). The staff 
shortage was the concern most cited by offi cials at the block 
and school levels. 
Second, the huge load of paperwork thrust upon these 
 offi cials as a result of various schemes enacted by the central 
and state governments takes considerable time and effort to 
fulfi l on a daily basis. The case of the headmistress of a prima-
ry school in Pindwara (elaborated in endnote 6) and another 
 instance in the same block where the teachers were more than 
happy to let me handle the class in order to fi nish fi lling up 
forms are cases in point. Finally, and with reference to Gupta’s 
argument about bureaucratic practices being “arbitrary,” I am 
inclined to argue that they must be viewed as systematic. I 
 began this essay with the image of bureaucrats sitting around 
leisurely, an image which fi ts in with every stereotype of a 
sarkaari naukri (government job) in India. Yet, the leisurely 
picture actually cloaked the process of working. Harriss and 
Jeffrey (2013) in their critique of Gupta’s (2012) work argue 
that “bureaucratic functioning is by no means as arbitrary and 
confused as Gupta suggests: rather, it systematically refl ects 
caste, class and gender privileges.” It is in the light of the con-
straints of my own fi eldwork and skills that I acknowledge the 
lack of a caste, class and even gender analysis in this article. 
However, I hope to have elaborated on the beech ka raasta tac-
tics that offi cials across the two blocks in Sirohi systematically 
use in order to get the job done. 
In this article, I have not tried to defend the lower-level offi -
cials I interacted with. I stand by the claim that my respond-
ents were committed to achieving targets, but their obsession 
with achieving the “monthly targets” is generally understood 
as producing, maintaining and supervising paperwork. The 
beech ka raasta methods, for instance, are primarily used and 
accepted to deliver the required paperwork.
Thus, where one would ideally want to evaluate the state of 
primary education in India by looking at qualitative aspects 
such as pedagogy or learning outputs, my experience links up 
with Mathur’s (2012) claim that the Indian state is a mere 
 producer of “paper truths.” While these “paper truths” are 
 obsessively produced in order to meet mandated targets, they 
do not address some of the fundamental problems in the 
 primary education set-up in India, such as the shortage of 
teachers, the alleged political control of transfers in the area, 
and other  resource constraints. This being the case, the 
 proliferation of new schemes to gain qualitative output 
is counterproductive. 
Notes
 1 The fi eldwork was conducted as a joint inde-
pendent fi eld study along with my friend and 
peer Anuj Joshi. However, the arguments in 
this paper must be read entirely as mine. Any 
mistakes in translation or interpretation of the 
interviews or quotes cited are therefore entirely 
mine. I use the collective pronoun “we” to de-
scribe instances from the fi eld and to detail re-
sponses from the offi cials and use “I” only in 
the latter part of the essay where I present my 
arguments.
 2 I am referring here to Pindwara block of Sirohi 
district in Rajasthan.
 3 There are a total of 187 primary, 65 secondary 
and 65 private schools in Pindwara block. 
Around 7–10 schools are clubbed together un-
der a nodal system with one headmaster or 
headmistress of a primary school appointed as 
the nodal headmaster/mistress.  
 4 Azim Premji Foundation, http://azimpremji-
foundation.org/About_Us.
 5 The word “stuck” was used to mean that there 
was no hope of transfer for the next few years. 
Transfers are  highly political and it is under-
stood that one can get through only by “know-
ing someone with infl uence.” Generally such 
people preferred areas like Sheoganj and the 
teachers in Pindwara were therefore stuck in 
the same school.
 6 On one particular occasion in Pindwara block, 
the headmaster and  teachers were busy updat-
ing their registers and documents for a block-
level meeting while also trying to put up a dis-
ciplined show for the sub-district magistrate’s 
visit on election duty (the school was to be used 
as a polling booth). In the process, all the 
teachers spent their time in the staffrooms 
while I was asked to handle students of Class 4. 
The headmaster soon left with my co-researcher 
for the block offi ce while I spent the entire 
morning at the school, interacting with stu-
dents and later with the teachers.
 7 The block education offi cer of Pindwara is 
 actually the additional block education offi cer, 
but since there was no block education offi cer 
appointed, the additional block education offi -
cer is in charge of the block education offi cer 
position as well.
 8 The right to education (RTE) was enacted in 
2009. The Continuous and Comprehensive 
Evaluation (CCE) programme is paired with 
the RTE Act and mandates that each school 
maintain a record of every student enrolled 
in elementary education (Classes 1–8) through 
a series of ongoing assessments instead of 
just year-end examinations. The Reading 
Campaign was introduced by the Rajasthan 
government in 2013 and seeks to regularly 
grade students’ ability to read in English and 
Hindi and grade them accordingly. Grades A, 
B and C are awarded to each student and the 
teachers and heads of school are expected to 
keep track of the improvements in reading 
 ability.
 9 This was evident in the sentiments shared by 
the block education offi cer  and his colleagues 
during a meeting in Sheoganj when he said 
that the views of the APF resource persons 
were not heard as “a voice from outside but as 
one of our own who has been working in 
the fi eld for a long time.” This incident is 
also  demonstrative of this resource person’s 
 relationship with the offi cials. We were al-
lowed to be present at the meeting and were 
surprised to see him occupying the discussion 
table and commanding the attention of all 
those asse mbled. Some of the headmasters in 
fact rushed to him after the meeting to  clarify 
doubts  further.
10 While the Mid-day Meal scheme in India has a 
long history, initially enacted by a few state 
governments  (Tamil Nadu, for instance, intro-
duced the scheme in 1956 during Kamaraj’s 
 regime), it gained the status of a centrally- 
sponsored scheme in 1995. The scheme is now 
funded by both central and state governments. 
The appointment of the cook-cum-helper is de-
pendent on the size of the school. For example, 
one cook-cum-helper is mandated for schools 
with up to 25 students and two cook-cum- 
helpers for schools with up to 100 students. 
One additional helper is allotted for every ad-
ditional 100 students. They are paid `1,000 as 
the base wage; however, this varies in each 
state.
11  This particular school’s headmistress was also 
the nodal headmistress and in charge of a girls’ 
primary school in Pindwara. It was practically 
impossible for her to run a school of 236 stu-
dents with just three teachers. She managed 
this by clubbing classes and spent the entire 
interview period sorting out various records 
and complaining about the responsibilities of 
being the nodal headmistress as well. Ironical-
ly, the school opposite the one she was in 
charge of was a senior secondary school for 
boys which comprised 225 students and seven 
staff members (plus a peon).
12 Under Section 21 of the RTE Act, every elemen-
tary school (government, aided and special 
category) is required to have a school manage-
ment committee that includes teachers and 
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parents. This is to ensure decentralised gov-
ernance and community or local participation 
in the management and functioning of the 
school. The committee requires three-fourths 
of its members to be parents (with 50% of this 
proportion reserved for women). The rest is 
 reserved for teachers, local authorities and stu-
dents. Amongst other roles and responsibili-
ties, the  school management committee is also 
in charge of appointing the mid-day meal cook-
cum-helper, a task that they rarely performed 
at the school I visited. The teacher informed me 
that the committee at this school hardly ever 
met or functioned and it thus fell upon him and 
his colleagues to appoint the mid-day meal 
cook-cum-helper.
13 The teacher did not elaborate on why such an 
adjustment was necessary. As far as the rules for 
the cook-cum-helper go, there is no provision for 
these individuals to claim regular appointment 
under the respective state governments (in this 
case, Government of Rajasthan).
14 From here on, I use “I” instead of “we”, as I out-
line my arguments individually, based on our 
joint fi eld experiences.
15  The term jugaad itself was never used by my 
respondents. They always used the phrase 
beech ka raasta whenever they referred to the 
innovative methods in their daily work routine. 
It is only for purposes of conceptual clarity that 
I use the term jugaad in order to understand 
the phrase beech ka raasta.
16 The idea of bureaucratic hierarchy is so well-
internalised amongst these offi cials  that it bor-
ders on parody. In one instance we observed 
the block education offi cer of Sheoganj (an oth-
erwise strong and decisive man) rush nervo-
usly into the offi ce demanding  the cutlery set 
reserved for the exclusive use of higher offi -
cials. The set was required to serve tea and 
snacks to the district education offi cer who 
happened to be in the block offi ce. It was the 
only time I  witnessed both the block education 
offi cer and the block resource person absolute-
ly frantic as they searched every nook and cor-
ner for the cutlery set. It was not, however, to 
be found. As I glanced at the block education 
offi cer’s cabin, I saw that he had seated himself 
on the visitor’s chair while reserving his own 
for his senior. 
17  The idea of seva is understood as tied to Hindu 
culture and tradition. All the bureaucrats I in-
teracted with were in fact Hindus (most of 
them upper-caste as well) and as mentioned in 
the essay, invoked seva to reiterate the idea of 
serving the country. 
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